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Abstract: 
Scientific representation is currently a booming topic, both in analytical philosophy and 
in history and philosophy of science. The analytical inquiry attempts to come to terms 
with the relation between theory and world; while historians and philosophers of science 
aim to develop an account of the practice of model building in the sciences. This article 
provides a review of recent work within both traditions, and ultimately argues for a 
practice-based account of the means employed by scientists to effectively achieve 
representations in the modelling sciences. 
 
 
1. The analytical and the practical inquiries 
 
Representation has become a booming topic in philosophy of science – if judged by the 
number of conferences, workshops, books and articles produced in the last few years. The 
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topic is at the crossroads of attempts in analytical philosophy to come to terms with the 
relation between theory and the world, and in the philosophy and history of science to 
develop a proper understanding of the practice of modelling in the sciences. Scientific 
representation also has overlap with, and has been claimed to have implications for, 
metaphysics, the philosophies of mind and language, and aesthetics. 
 
The interest from analytical philosophy is related to the notion of reference, and the 
metaphysics of relations; the interest from philosophy of science is related to an attempt 
to understand modelling practices. These two distinct forms of inquiry into the nature of 
representation may be distinguished as the “analytical inquiry” and the “practical 
inquiry”. Although they are not exclusive, they impose different demands and point in 
different directions. The analytical inquiry seems to have historically preceded the 
practical one, but the relative importance of the latter has grown to the extent that in 
recent years it has become dominant. This mainly reflects the intense attention that 
philosophers have paid to scientific models and modelling practice in the last decades. 
 
The analytical inquiry tends to presuppose that representation is a relation, and focuses on 
providing an analysis of this relation. It is useful to begin by fixing some terminology as 
follows. Let us refer to the vehicle of the representation as the ‘source’; and the object as 
its ‘target’. (Thus in a portrait the canvas is the source and the person portrayed is the 
target). Anything can in principle play the role of sources or targets, so these terms are 
mere place-holders. I shall assume that X is the source and Y is the target if and only if 
‘X represents Y’ is true. The analytical inquiry then, in its most basic form, takes it that 
 3 
representation is a relation R such that the assertion that ‘X represents Y’ is equivalent to 
the assertion that ‘R holds between X and Y’. (The most basic form assumes a uniquely 
specified dyadic relation that holds between all sources and targets. But the analytical 
inquiry can take more complex forms, and there are different ways in which this 
assumption may be relaxed).  
 
The contemporary literature on the analytical inquiry into representation goes at least as 
far back as Charles Peirce, who provided one of the earliest and most influential theories 
of signs – a term he used ambiguously to refer to different sorts of representations and 
representational sources alike. In more contemporary terms, Peirce’s theory lays down a 
triadic relation between the source, a sign in some symbol system (or, according to Peirce, 
the representamen); its target (or object in Peirce’s terminology) and an interpretation or 
understanding of this sign (the interpretans for Peirce). Moreover, in Peirce’s terms, a 
representation is a non-degenerate, e.g. essentially triadic, relation: it can not be further 
decomposed or analysed into a complex function of more basic dyadic relations between 
representamen, object and interpretans. 
2
  
 
Peirce famously went on to divide all representations into three types: iconic, symbolic, 
and indexical. Roughly, the sources of iconic representations bear similarities to their 
targets, those of indexes bear causal relations, while symbols denote their targets 
conventionally. Thus a portrait is typically an icon of the person portrayed, smoke is 
often an index of fire, and the word “cat” is a symbol of the feline animal. In all cases the 
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triadic relation is distinct and can not be reduced to a function of the dyadic relations 
(“similarity”, “causation”, “denotation”) that hold between source and target.  3 
 
By contrast, the practical inquiry has avoided questions regarding the nature of the 
representational relation, focusing instead upon the very diverse range of models and 
modelling techniques employed in the sciences. The presupposition behind this type of 
inquiry is that these modelling techniques must be properly understood in their context of 
application. The literature on modelling in science is by now immense. Some of the 
historical key texts include Norman Campbell’s (1920) and Mary Hesse’s (1966). In the 
last two decades the turn towards what I have referred to as the practical inquiry has 
intensified. This movement takes model building to be the primary form of 
representational activity, so a very large amount of work has been devoted to studying 
particular cases of models and modelling in painstaking detail in order to figure out in 
what specific ways models are helpful to the modellers in their diverse pursuits. 
4
  
 
One theme shared by all these attempts to understand modeling is the emphasis on use. 
The assumption runs through that without an appreciation of the particular use of a model 
in its context of application it is impossible to fully appreciate its role.  
We need to pull our gaze away from the relation between the entities (equations and so 
on) that carry out the representational work and their targets, in order to consider also the 
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purposes of those who use and develop the representations. Many different issues become 
visible when this wider vision is adopted including the phenomenon known as 
transference – of both knowledge and representational techniques – from one field to 
another. The same representational source may be used to represent several targets in 
different fields. 
5
  
 
Given these two forms of inquiry into scientific representation, it is not surprising that the 
questions typically also come in two varieties. First, when we say of a model X (a graph, 
an equation, a diagram, etc) that it represents a system Y (a physical object, a 
phenomenon, a population, etc.) we may ask, in an analytical spirit, what exactly is the 
relation R presupposed between X and Y. In other words, what is the relation R that 
constitutes representation? Let us refer to this as the constitutional question. Second, we 
may ask about any specific use of a model what kind of features and properties obtain in 
the wider context of application that allow models to perform their job. In other words, 
what are the effective means that scientists employ to get representations to deliver the 
required ‘goods’? We may refer to this as the pragmatic question. 
 
Section 2 develops some key distinctions to address these questions. Sections 3 and 4 
outline some of the main accounts of representation available, and defend a deflationary 
and non-reductive option, the inferential conception. Section 5 takes stock and draws 
some conclusions.  
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2. Constituents versus means: Representation and accuracy 
 
The analytical inquiry pursues definition and conceptual analysis, and it emphasizes what 
I called the constitutional question. It is interested in the relation R that must conceptually 
hold between source and target for the source to represent the target. Thus theories of the 
constituents will typically implicitly answer the question: what is scientific representation?  
The practical inquiry by contrast focuses on what I call means. It studies those context 
dependent properties and features of a particular representing situation that make the 
source useful for scientists as a representation of the target. It is interested in pragmatic 
questions regarding the actual workings of models, including (but not limited to) 
judgements of accuracy or faithfulness. Accounts of the means of representation will 
typically provide case by case analyses of the types of properties, relational or not, of 
sources, targets, users, purposes, and context – both the context of inquiry and the wider 
social context – for any given particular representation. 
6
 
 
We may attempt some tentative definitions as follows: 
 
Constituents: R is the constituents of representation if and only if for any source-target 
pair (S,T): S represents T if and only if R (S, T, x), where x sums up whatever additional 
elements come into the relation of representation. 
7
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Means: For any source-target pair (S, T) at a given time and in a given context: R’ is the 
means of the representation of T by S if some user of the model employs R’ (at that time 
and in that context) in order to draw inferences about T from S. 
 
Concerning these definitions, the following remarks are in order. First, the constituents 
are implicitly defined by a necessary and sufficient condition; but the means are simply 
characterized via a sufficient condition. Second, note the inverted order of quantifiers: R 
is a unique and universal relation for any source-target pair, while R’ is a context-
dependent, time-indexed relation, which is not unique even for a particular source-target 
pair, never mind universally. Finally note that the means are pragmatic and context-
dependent, while the constituents are analytical and do not depend on anything that does 
not come under the definition of the representational relation itself. 
 
The distinction leads naturally to a further and important distinction. Philosophical 
discussions concerning scientific representation have in the past often focused upon the 
accuracy of scientific models. Fortunately this is no longer the case, and nowadays 
representation is carefully distinguished from truth, accuracy or faithfulness. 8  The 
distinction is essential to make sense of the phenomenon of scientific misrepresentation. 
Models often are inaccurate and misrepresent in some definite ways. This does not 
however take away any of their representational power: An imperfect and inaccurate 
model M of some target system T is still a model of T. (Just as an inaccurate portrait, 
such as a caricature, is still a representation of the person portrayed). The puzzles 
regarding the notion of representation are prior to and independent of issues of accuracy.  
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It may help to focus on a simple and graphical example from the engineering sciences: 
the Forth Rail Bridge in Edinburgh, one of the first steel-built cantilever bridges in 
Europe.
 9
 The following is a graphical representation: 
 
 
 
The point is that there are two questions one may ask about this graph. First, what object 
or system in the world does this graph represent? In our terminology the graph is the 
source of the representation and the actual bridge is its target. Only once this is 
established can a further question be meaningfully posed: how accurate, or faithful, is this 
graph as a representation of the bridge? If the graph represented something else – e.g. the 
complicated pattern of tensile forces acting on a telegraph line – the assessment of its 
accuracy might turn out to be very different. So questions of representation must be 
settled before judgements of accuracy or faithfulness are formulated; otherwise there is 
no standard against which to draw such judgements. And this shows that the two 
questions are distinct. 
  
The distinction may be accommodated in terms of the definitions of constituents and 
means as follows. There are many properties of the graph that a user may take interest in 
when applying it in order to find out useful information about the bridge. Even among the 
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geometric properties, we might be interested in the geometric relation between the lines, 
and use them as a guide regarding the relation between the steel cantilevers – for which 
the graph above is quite accurate. Or we might look into average distance from the 
railway to water surface – for which it is less accurate for any particular time and day of 
the year. Finally we could gain an interest in the shape of the Forth’s basin – for which 
the graph is even more grossly inaccurate. Then there are non-geometrical properties of 
course. The colour of the lines in the graph is by and large an inaccurate indicator of the 
colour of the different parts of the bridge. And the texture of the paper the graph is 
printed on is a very unreliable indicator of the strength of the bridge. Etc. All these are 
means, each in its context of inquiry. Some are clearly more effective than others in 
generating accurate representations, but they all provide some benchmark for accuracy 
judgements. Moreover they are all in principle consistent with the claim that the graph 
printed on the paper represents the bridge. Whatever constituent R is the truth maker of 
this claim at best one of the means R’ can be identical to it. Hence means and constituents 
differ from each other, and the means suffice for accuracy judgements in general. 
 
 
3. Reductive accounts: Similarity and isomorphism 
 
Let us now first focus on some accounts of the constituents of representation. It is useful 
to begin by dividing such accounts into different kinds. Two dichotomies will be 
particularly useful. First, an account of representation in science is reductive if it 
analytically defines the representational relation R in terms of something else. By 
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contrast the account is primitivist if it claims that the representational relation, if there is 
any, may not be further analyzed – it is rather a primitive that may be invoked elsewhere, 
e.g. for explanatory purposes. 10 
 
Another dichotomy divides substantive from deflationary accounts. A substantive 
account takes it that representation is a robust property or relation of sources and targets. 
A deflationary view will take it instead that representation is not a robust property or 
relation of sources and targets; the term “representation” on this view just picks out some 
functional dependencies within a particular context of inquiry.  
 
These distinctions are in principle orthogonal to each other. That is, primitivism is 
compatible with a substantive or a deflationary view; and similarly for reductionism. It 
stands to reason, however, that substantive theories will be more naturally reductive, 
while deflationary views will tend towards primitivism. The reduction of one notion to 
another is typically motivated by an attempt to figure out the real robust properties 
underlying that notion. 
11
 A deflationary approach by contrast will normally eschew 
reduction: although a reduction of some notion X to a further non-substantive notion Y is 
in principle a possibility, the cognitive gain seems small.  
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And indeed the two main reductionist accounts available are also substantive. One claims 
to reduce representation to isomorphism, the other to similarity as follows.12 
 
The similarity conception of representation [sim]: A represents B if and only if A and B 
are similar.
13
 
 
The isomorphism conception of representation [iso]: A represents B if and only if A and 
B instantiate isomorphic structures.
14
 
 
Both accounts are backed up by some strong intuitions. For instance, the graph of the 
Forth rail bridge is similar in some relevant respects to the bridge itself: the relative 
distances and ratios between the cantilevers and girders are preserved, as is the average 
distance between the bridge’s three land stands relative to the distances between the 
beams in each stand. There are of course other ways in which the piece of paper that the 
graph is printed on does not seem to be relevantly similar to the bridge, such as its colour 
or texture. So this already gives us a sense of how “similarity” as a means may be used to 
ground judgements of representation. The source only represents in those respects that 
are relevantly similar to the target.  
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There are however several powerful arguments against [sim], which make the position 
untenable. I will only mention one here, the so called ‘logical argument’, which derives 
from Nelson Goodman’s critique of resemblance in the arts. 
15
 Goodman pointed out that 
while representation is non-reflexive, non-symmetric and non-transitive, resemblance is 
an equivalence relation. Similarity need not be transitive (certainly ‘relevant similarity’ is 
not) but it is reflexive and symmetrical. So it can not provide a reduction basis for 
representation in general, since it does not possess the right properties to carry out the job. 
(To state the obvious counterexample: while the graph represents the Forth rail bridge, 
the bridge does not represent the graph). 
 
But also note that the similarity discussed is relational, in the sense that what gets 
preserved in our example are the properties of the structure of beams and cantilevers. 
Mathematically this may be expressed as an isomorphism between two structures. 
Suppose that the structure of beams and cantilevers in the rail bridge may be written 
down as Sb = <Db, R
i
b>, where Db is the set of elements in the structure, and {R
i
b} are the 
predicates defined over the elements of Db. 
16
 For instance, we may assume that every 
beam is an element in the structure, and the number of intersections of each beam with 
other beams are the relations. Hence there will be beams that intersect only once, beams 
that intersect twice, and so on. And these form a structure. We can similarly write down a 
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holding between the elements in the domain, and functions, or operations Oi acting on those elements. 
Functions are ignored here since irrelevant to our purposes. 
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structure Sg = <Dg, R
i
g> for the lines and vertices in the graph. And then we can just 
check for isomorphism between Sb and Sg. 
 
Hence structural similarity is a special case of similarity. And indeed in the mathematical 
sciences structural similarity is often the only relevant kind. A problem remains however 
for the view that takes representation in science in general to be reducible to isomorphism. 
For the sources and targets of a representation are not generally mathematical entities. 
The graph of the Forth rail bridge is a good example of a representation of a concrete 
physical object by another concrete physical object. To apply isomorphism to such 
objects we need to appeal to the instantiation of structure.
17
 We may say that an object 
instantiates some structure if there is some division in parts and relations of the object 
that agrees with the structure. The procedure above then shows that the bridge instantiates 
Sb, and the graph instantiates Sg. 
 
The definition of [iso] makes all this explicit. But it does not make explicit that 
instantiation is multiple: every object or system instantiates more than one structure. 
Suppose for example that instead of considering the beams and cantilevers of the bridge, 
we take its vertices (the points where at least two beams cross) to constitute the elements 
of the domain. We can then say that the structure is made up of a number of elements, 
namely all the vertices, endowed with certain properties such as the number of beams that 
join together at any given vertex. Hence some vertices join two beams, some join three, 
and so on. This structure S’b = <D’b, R’
i
b> is also instantiated by the bridge. Since the 
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number of vertices is larger than the number of beams the two structures are not 
isomorphic and we conclude that the bridge instantiates distinct and non-isomorphic 
structures. A similar reasoning would seem to go through for any physical object 
whatsoever. Since there are always different ways of cutting out its domain of elements 
and relations, every physical object instantiates simultaneously several structures. The 
physical world underdetermines its mathematical structure – which may only be ascribed 
under a particular description.  
 
Thus the most sophisticated account [iso], while being universally applicable, has a 
problem with under-determination. Since the structure that sources and targets instantiate 
is underdetermined, it is also underdetermined whether they stand in the representational 
relation dictated by [iso]. (Additionally [iso] is prey to the same objection raised against 
[sim]: unlike representation, isomorphism is an equivalence relation).  
 
So both attempts at reducing representation fail. Some alternative, weaker notions of 
similarity may be employed in the definition of [sim]; and weaker morphisms have been 
invoked in the definition of [iso]. But even with such modifications they continue to be 
subject to a variety of objections. 18 A more promising approach is to give up on the aim 
to reduce representation to such notions, and either show them to be the by-product of 
representation in particular domains, or else relax the need for necessary and sufficient 
conditions. This leads us to consider non-reductive or primitivist accounts. 
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4. Non-reductive accounts: “DDI” and the inferential conception 
 
Non-reductive accounts may be deflationary or substantive. Roughly a substantive non-
reductive account takes it that representation is a genuine property or relation but it is not 
further analysable or reducible to other properties. At best we can establish some 
necessary conditions or point out some of its most general features. So on this view the 
analytical inquiry is worth applying, although it is limited by the very nature of its subject 
– which does not allow a proper definition. A deflationary account, by contrast, takes it 
that the concept of representation is essentially linked to its use, and is thus best 
characterised by its function or role in the practice of model-building. On this view the 
analytical inquiry is inappropriate for scientific representation, which is best approached 
in the first instance via the practical inquiry. Non-reductive accounts will typically line up 
on a spectrum from strongly substantive to radically deflationary. 
 
An example of non-reductive account is the DDI (Denotation-Demonstration-
Interpretation) model developed by RIG Hughes in (Hughes, 1997). On this account 
representation can not be further reduced. In particular it can not be reduced to the 
combination of the three typical elements of denotation, demonstration and interpretation; 
with denotation the most substantive. 
19
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On this account a representation is a heterogeneous mixture of a relation and activity 
involving typically three phases. First, the model denotes the system modelled. This 
denotation is essentially conventional, and is the core relation between representational 
source and target. For example, in the case of the graph of the Forth rail bridge, the graph 
is supposedly stipulated as a representation of the bridge and is henceforth taken to 
denote it. Second, a demonstration takes place, broadly understood as the proof or 
derivation of a new result from some general features of the model. For instance, if we 
measure the relative lengths of vertical and horizontal cantilevers on the graph we can 
calculate a ratio between the length and the height of the bridge in the graph. The third 
step involves interpretation: bringing these results to bear on the original target of the 
representation. In the case of our graph calculation, for example, we can apply the ratio 
directly to the length of the horizontal cantilevers in the actual rail bridge in order to find 
out its height.  
 
The advantages of the DDI account over the reductive accounts are many and varied. It 
skilfully avoids many of the objections, including the logical argument, since denotation 
is essentially involved and is clearly a directional notion: it is non-reflexive, non-
symmetric and non-transitive. It also nicely connects the analytical and the practical 
inquiry, since on the one hand denotation calls for analysis, while on the other hand 
demonstration and interpretation are activities governed by their corresponding operating 
norms, and therefore require a practical inquiry. 
 
 17 
However, the DDI account also suffers from some difficulties. First, although Hughes 
does not require demonstration essentially he does take it to be typical of scientific 
representation. This seems to entail that those models that have not yet been employed in 
demonstrating new results about their targets do not typically qualify as representations. 
For instance, suppose that I just come across the graph of the rail bridge, with a label 
attached to it that clearly stipulates the actual bridge as its proper target. The DDI account 
seems to entail that I am not entitled to take the graph to be a representation unless I carry 
out some demonstration on it – such as the ratio calculation mentioned above – which 
seems counterintuitive. Second, the requirement that the source denotes the target implies 
that the target must be a real entity. Thus the representation of fictional entities is ruled 
out, which seems to compromise many scientific models throughout history. (For 
instance, models of the ether would be turn on this view to be non-representational). 
 
The DDI account may in principle be amended to overcome these difficulties. First, the 
requirement that sources denote their targets could be replaced by the weaker requirement 
that they have “denotative function”, which allows representation of fictional entities. 
20
 
Second, demonstration could be replaced by the weaker “potential for demonstration” 
which does not require the actual carrying out of any reasoning on the part of any agent. 
The resulting account (let us call it the Denotative Function – Potential for Demonstration 
– Interpretation, or ‘DFPDI’ account) is certainly not simple, but that may just reflect the 
fact that representation itself is not simple. (A simpler account that stays within 
Goodman’s tradition would employ the notion of exemplification. On this account a 
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model represents by exemplifying certain features of the target, which does not require 
reference to the target itself. 21)  
 
A more deflationary account, the inferential conception, has also been argued to 
overcome these difficulties. 
22
 On the inferential conception representation is a ‘two 
vector’ notion, requiring on the one hand representational force and on the other hand 
inferential capacities. The conditions are weak enough (they are in particular weaker than 
either denotation or demonstration) that we may stipulate them to be necessary on 
scientific representation without any loss of generality. Representational force is a feature 
of the practice of using a particular source as a representation, which determines its 
intended target. On this view the representational target is not determined merely as a 
result of a convention or stipulation, but must be established by the norms that govern the 
practice (of this particular representation). Consider the Forth rail bridge graph again. The 
graph is not a representation of the actual bridge merely by an act of stipulation. On the 
contrary the graph was constructed already within a practice that took it that its 
representational target would be the bridge. The relevant practice can of course change 
over time but representational force is always the feature of that evolving practice that 
selects the target that corresponds to a particular source at any given time. 23 
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 Suppose that the graph was constructed in a completely independent manner (say, randomly and without 
any purpose in mind) and only by means of some act of stipulation came to be a representational source for 
the bridge. It is still the case that thereafter any representational use of the graph is embedded in a particular 
practice of representation – with norms that establish its proper representational force.  
 19 
The inferential conception adds a second condition, which is specifically required for 
scientific representation. The source must have the capacity to be employed by an 
informed and competent user in order to draw valid inferences regarding the target – what 
is known as ‘surrogative’ reasoning or inference. 
24
 This requirement certainly requires 
unravelling, since it brings together several features of the practice of scientific 
representation. First of all, for the source to have this capacity it needs to be endowed 
with some internal structure: it must be the case that the source can be divided into parts 
and the relations between the different parts can be outlined. Secondly, the source’s parts 
and relations are in some way interpreted in terms of the target’s own parts and relations. 
This is an implicit condition without which surrogative inference would be impossible. 25 
Finally, there must be some set of norms of inference in place to distinguish clearly those 
inferences that are correctly drawn from those that are not. Supposedly, in the case of 
deductive inference, they must include at least those norms that establish logical 
consequence. But exactly how those are applied in detail, and whether or not additional 
norms are applicable in surrogative inference, will also depend on the features of the 
model and the context in which it is employed. 
26
 
 
 
5. Intended use versus intentional conceptions 
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 The original insight that surrogative reasoning is essential to scientific representation is due to Chris 
Swoyer (Swoyer, 1991). 
25
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 Note that the inferential conception does not stipulate the inferences must be to true conclusions. All 
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 20 
Both denotation and representational force have built in what we may call the ‘outwards 
directionality of representation’. They direct from source to target in the appropriate way, 
thus allowing the DDI account and the inferential conception to avoid the logical 
argument against the reductive accounts. Representational sources typically do not 
represent themselves: the same object is not both source and target of the very same 
representation. Similarly, the fact that the source represents the target does not imply that 
the target also represents the source. And certainly neither denotation nor representational 
force are transitive relations. The word “dove” means and denotes a type of bird that can 
in turn be used to denote peace, but it does not follow that “dove” means peace. 
27
  
 
The directionality of representation has sometimes been conflated or assimilated to its 
supposed ‘intentionality’. 
28
 Intentionality is a well known hallmark of mental 
representation – often taken to be the defining feature of mental or cognitive states. The 
insight of course goes all the way back to Brentano within the phenomenological 
tradition – which takes intentionality to be a non-natural and non-reducible property. By 
contrast, the analytical tradition tends to understand intentionality as a natural property, 
possibly reducible to further physical properties. But in either case the claim that 
scientific representation is intentional entails that it shares the intrinsic ‘aboutness’ of 
mental phenomena. This suggests that a scientific model represents via someone’s mental 
state, i.e. that two objects stand in a representational relation if and only if they are so 
                                                 
27
 There may be exceptions. One must be careful in stating the logical properties of representation, which is 
merely non-reflexive, non-symmetric and non-transitive. 
28
 Among defenders of an intentional conception of representation in general Van Fraassen (1995), Frigg 
(2006), Callender and Cohen (2006), and Giere (forthcoming) all favour an ‘intentionality’ version. Van 
Fraassen (2008, esp. chapter 2) by contrast endorses an intended use conception akin to those of Hughes 
(1997) and Suárez (1999). 
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‘connected’ in the mental or cognitive state of a particular agent. We may even sum up 
the intentionality conception in the slogan that ‘representation is a property of the mind’.  
 
To return to our example, the graph would be a representation of the bridge because it is 
so connected in the mind of some agent. (The details are somewhat mysterious however: 
How exactly does the directionality of the graph towards the bridge follow from the 
aboutness of mental states towards their objects – which after all include both graph and 
bridge, i.e. both sources and targets?)  Note also that an intentionality conception is in 
principle amenable to an analytical inquiry, albeit not in its most basic form, since 
representation would not be a simple dyadic relation. But a more sophisticated analysis, 
such as Peirce’s, whereby representation is essentially triadic, seems viable. 29  
 
In other words, an intentionality conception seems perfectly apt as a substantive and 
reductive theory of representation. Consequently a non-reductive or deflationary account 
is unlikely to trade in intentionality. And indeed neither the DFPDI account nor the 
inferential conception appeal to mental or cognitive states in any essential way. These 
accounts instead appeal to the intended uses of a representation. The DFPDI account has 
representation by models equated with a relation (denotation) plus some activities 
(demonstration and interpretation); and both relation and activities are the product of 
some act or acts performed by the users of the models. The inferential conception does 
away even with the relation, and takes representation to be the conjunction of two 
                                                 
29
 There are some caveats. For example Peirce takes his interpretans to always be also a representamen in a 
new representation of the object, and so on ad infinitum. (See e.g. Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Charles 
Sanders Peirce, section 10). This is clearly not required for an intentional conception of representation, 
since the mental state that provides the ground level connection between the source and the target is not 
required to be further represented by any other mental state. 
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activities that are carried out in the context of some established collective practice. It 
follows that on these accounts representation is not at all ‘in the mind’ of any particular 
agent. It is rather ‘in the world’, and more particularly in the social world – as a 
prominent activity or set of activities carried out by those communities of inquirers 
involved in the practice of scientific modelling.  
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